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Coin flipping is a cryptographic primitive in which two spatially separated players, who in principle
do not trust each other, wish to establish a common random bit. If we limit ourselves to classical
communication, this task requires either assumptions on the computational power of the players or
it requires them to send messages to each other with sufficient simultaneity to force their complete
independence. Without such assumptions, all classical protocols are so that one dishonest player has
complete control over the outcome. If we use quantum communication, on the other hand, protocols
have been introduced that limit the maximal bias that dishonest players can produce. However, those
protocols would be very difficult to implement in practice because they are susceptible to realistic
losses on the quantum channel between the players or in their quantum memory and measurement
apparatus. In this paper, we introduce a novel quantum protocol and we prove that it is completely
impervious to loss. The protocol is fair in the sense that either player has the same probability
of success in cheating attempts at biasing the outcome of the coin flip. We also give explicit and
optimal cheating strategies for both players.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.a.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coin flipping by telephone was first introduced with
these words by Manuel Blum in 1981: “Alice and Bob
[. . . ] have just divorced, live in different cities, want to
decide who gets the car” [6]. They agree that the best
thing to do is to flip a coin, but neither of them trusts the
other and they are unable to agree on a mutually trusted
third party to do the flip for them. More generally, coin-
flipping protocols (also known as “coin-tossing”) can be
used whenever two players need to pick a random bit
even though it could be to the advantage of one of them
(or perhaps both) to choose, or at least bias, the outcome
of the protocol.
The original coin-flipping protocol introduced by Blum
is asynchronous in the sense that it consists of a sequence
of rounds in which the two players alternate in sending
messages to each other. The security of Blum’s protocol
depends on the assumed difficulty of factoring large num-
bers. Such an assumption is of course of little value in
our quantum world, owing to Peter Shor’s algorithm [30],
but classical coin flipping can be based on more general
one-way functions, which could potentially be immune
to quantum attacks. Nevertheless, any coin-flipping pro-
tocol that takes place by the asynchronous transmission
of classical messages has the property that one of the
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players has complete control over the outcome, given suf-
ficient computing power. In the best case, such protocols
can be computationally secure, and even that depends on
unproven computational complexity assumptions.
Unconditionally secure classical coin-flipping protocols
are possible in the synchronous model, in which the play-
ers are requested to send messages to each other with suf-
ficient simultaneity to force their complete independence.
Such protocols are called relativistic because special rela-
tivity must be invoked to prevent Alice from waiting to
receive Bob’s message before choosing her own (and vice
versa). Relativistic protocols must be implemented care-
fully because their security depends crucially on the phys-
ical distance between the players, and either of them
could try to fool the other by pretending to be farther
away than they really are. Such cheating attempts can
be thwarted if each player has a trusted agent near
the other player [19]. For the rest of this paper, we
only consider asynchronous protocols and “coin-flipping
protocol” will systematically mean “asynchronous coin-
flipping protocol”.
In quantum coin-flipping protocols, Alice and Bob are
allowed to exchange quantum states. Such protocols
were first investigated in 1984 by Charles H. Bennett
and Gilles Brassard [4]. In that paper, a protocol was
presented and it was shown that “ironically [it] can be
subverted by use of a still subtler quantum phenomenon,
the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox”, making it the
first use of entanglement [13] in quantum cryptography.
We shall refer to it henceforth as the “BB84 protocol”
(not to be confused with the better-known quantum key
distribution protocol introduced in the same paper). The
question was left open: Can there be a perfect quantum
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2coin-flipping protocol? The proof that this is impossible
was given more than a decade later by Hoi-Kwong Lo
and Hoi Fung Chau [23], whose result was further clari-
fied by Dominic Mayers, Louis Salvail and Yoshie Chiba-
Kohno [25]. Nevertheless, if quantum coin-flipping pro-
tocols cannot be perfect, can they at least be better than
anything classically possible?
To make this question more precise, we say that one
player enjoys an ε-bias if a cheating strategy exists by
which that player could choose either bit and influence
the outcome of the protocol to be that bit with prob-
ability at least 12 + ε, assuming that the other player
follows the protocol honestly. This definition is uncondi-
tional in the sense that we allow the would-be cheater to
enjoy unlimited computational power and a technology
limited only by the laws of physics. The bias of a pro-
tocol is the largest value of ε so that at least one player
enjoys an ε-bias. A perfect protocol would be one whose
bias is 0, but they cannot exist, classical or quantum.
At the other end of the spectrum, a protocol whose bias
is 0.5 is considered to be completely broken. All classical
protocols are completely broken by this definition, and
so is the BB84 quantum protocol. The question at the
end of the previous paragraph was therefore: Is there a
quantum coin-flipping protocol whose bias is strictly less
than 0.5?
The first such protocol was discovered in 2000 by
Dorit Aharonov, Amnon Ta-Shma, Umesh Vazirani and
Andrew C.-C. Yao [1], who proved that the bias of their
protocol (ATVY) is at most
√
2− 1 < 0.42 (without any
claim concerning the tightness of their bound). It was
subsequently proven by Robert W. Spekkens and Terry
Rudolph [32] that the ATVY protocol is even better
than its inventors had thought: its bias is in fact exactly√
2/4 < 0.36. In the same paper, Spekkens and Rudolph
gave an amazingly simple coin-flipping protocol that
achieves the same bias as well as another one whose
bias is merely (
√
5− 1)/4 < 0.31. According to an earlier
paper of theirs [31], that’s the smallest bias possible for
a coin-flipping protocol in which the quantum communi-
cation is limited to a single qubit.
Meanwhile, Andris Ambainis [2] and, independently,
Spekkens and Rudolph [31] discovered quantum coin-
flipping protocols whose bias 0.25 is even smaller, but
they require the transmission of a qutrit (or one qubit
and two qutrits in the case of Spekkens and Rudolph).
On the other hand, Alexei Kitaev [21] proved that no
quantum coin-flipping protocol can have a bias below
(
√
2− 1)/2 ≈ 0.21. Very recently, Andre´ Chailloux
and Iordanis Kerenidis [9] have announced a quantum
coin-flipping protocol whose bias is arbitrarily close to
Kitaev’s bound, but it requires an unlimited number of
rounds of interaction as it approaches this bound.
Despite the theoretical success of quantum coin-
flipping protocols, compared to classical protocols, severe
practical problems inherent to their implementation have
been discussed by Jonathan Barrett and Serge Massar [3],
who argued that quantum coin flipping is problematic in
any realistic scenario in which noise and loss can occur in
the processing (preparation, transmission and measure-
ment) of quantum information. For this reason, they
proposed random bit-string generation instead of single-
shot coin flipping. However, this is not interesting from
a quantum cryptographic perspective because the same
goal can be achieved with purely classical means [8].
In a subsequent paper (NFPM) written in collabo-
ration with Anh Tuan Nguyen, Julien Frison and Kien
Phan Huy, Massar has defined a figure of merit on which
quantum coin-flipping protocols can outperform any pos-
sible classical protocol even in a realistic setting and they
have verified their concept experimentally [27]. Even
though their protocol is not broken in the presence of
loss, however, Alice can choose the outcome with near
certainty in a realistic setting. We claim that, in order
to be of practical use, a protocol should be loss tolerant,
which we define as being completely impervious to loss of
quantum information. In this sense, the NFPM protocol
is not loss tolerant because its bias increases asymptoti-
cally towards 0.5 as losses become more and more severe,
which is unavoidable in practice (with current technol-
ogy) over increasing distance between Alice and Bob.
In this paper, we concentrate on this most likely source
of imperfection in actual implementations, namely losses.
With the exception of the NFPM protocol mentioned
above (which is not loss tolerant), all previously proposed
quantum coin-flipping protocols become completely inse-
cure even in the absence of noise as soon as the quan-
tum channel between Alice and Bob is lossy. We intro-
duce the first loss-tolerant quantum coin-flipping proto-
col. We prove that our protocol is fair in the sense that
either Alice or Bob can enjoy a bias of exactly 0.4 with an
optimal cheating strategy, independently of the channel’s
transmission and other sources of losses, provided quan-
tum information that is not lost is prepared, transmitted
and measured faithfully.
After this Introduction, the structure of the paper is
as follows. We begin in Section II with a review of the
original 1984 quantum coin-flipping protocol of Bennett
and Brassard [4] and we explain why it is completely
vulnerable to a so-called EPR-attack. This is interest-
ing not only for historical reasons, but also because our
novel loss-tolerant protocol follows the same template.
Section III reviews perhaps the most famous of all quan-
tum coin-flipping protocols, due to Ambainis [2], whose
theoretical bias is 0.25. However, we demonstrate in
Section IV that the security of that protocol is com-
pletely compromised in the presence of arbitrarily small
channel loss. Moreover, we argue that this problem is
inherent to the protocol in the sense that it cannot be
repaired with small corrections. (The same would be
true of the 0.25-bias qutrit-based coin-flipping protocol
due to Spekkens and Rudolph [31] as well as of their
optimal single-qubit protocol [32].) This is due to the
notion of conclusive measurements, which we review in
Section V. We show in Section VI how to combine the
strengths of the original BB84 protocol with those of the
3ATVY protocol (which is not loss tolerant either in its
published form) to finally achieve loss tolerance in quan-
tum coin flipping and we analyse the security of our pro-
tocol. Conclusions and open problems are presented in
Section VII.
II. THE BB84 PROTOCOL
We review the original BB84 quantum coin-flipping
protocol as well as the way it can be broken [4]. Here
are the so-called BB84 states:
|ψ0,0〉 = |0〉
|ψ0,1〉 = |1〉
}
a = 0
|ψ1,0〉 = |+〉
|ψ1,1〉 = |−〉
}
a = 1 ,
where |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. We say of |ψa,x〉 that a is
the basis and x is the bit. We define measurement bases
Ba = {|ψa,0〉, |ψa,1〉} (1)
for a ∈ {0, 1}. In the full BB84 quantum coin-flipping
protocol [4], Alice would prepare and send Bob a large
number of qubits, all in the same randomly chosen
basis a. To emphasize the essential features of the pro-
tocol, however, we outline below a simplified version in
which a single qubit is used.
1. Alice prepares one of the four BB84 states |ψa,x〉
with basis a and bit x chosen independently at ran-
dom; she transmits that qubit to Bob.
2. Bob chooses a random aˆ ∈ {0, 1} and measures the
received qubit in basis Baˆ; let Bob’s result be xˆ.
3. Bob sends a randomly chosen bit b to Alice.
4. Alice reveals her original a and x to Bob.
5. If a = aˆ and x 6= xˆ, Bob aborts the protocol, calling
Alice a cheater ; if a 6= aˆ, Bob has no way to verify
Alice’s honesty.
6. If Bob did not abort the protocol, the outcome of
the coin flip is a⊕ b, where “⊕” denotes the sum
modulo 2 (also known as the “exclusive or”).
In this protocol, Bob cannot cheat at all. The only
strategy for a cheating Bob would be to make an edu-
cated guess on Alice’s choice of a before deciding on the b
to send her at step 3, so as to bias the coin-flip outcome
a⊕ b. However, a corresponds to Alice’s random choice
of basis. Hence, the state ρa received by Bob at step 1 is
either ρ0 = 12 |0〉〈0|+ 12 |1〉〈1| or ρ1 = 12 |+〉〈+|+ 12 |−〉〈−|.
It follows from the fact that ρ0 = ρ1 that it is impossible
for Bob to guess the value of a better than at random.
On the other hand, it is obvious that Alice can bias
the protocol if she does not mind the risk of being
called a cheater. The simplest approach is to be hon-
est in the first step. When she receives b from Bob,
the probability is 50% that she is happy with the out-
come a⊕ b, in which case she proceeds honestly with
the protocol. On the other hand, if she is unhappy
with a⊕ b, she can lie on a at step 4 and send a ran-
dom x. In that case, her probability of being caught
is 25% since Bob chose aˆ 6= a with probability 50%, in
which case he obtained xˆ 6= x also with probability 50%.
All counted, this allows her to enjoy a 0.375-bias.
A slightly more interesting cheat is for her to send state
(cos kpi8 )|0〉+ (sin kpi8 )|1〉 for a random k ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7} at
step 1 and declare the a that suits her wish (with the
appropriately chosen x) at step 4. This allows her
to enjoy a bias of 12 cos
2 pi
8 = (2 +
√
2)/8 > 0.42, with a
probability 12 sin
2 pi
8 = (2−
√
2)/8 < 8% of being called a
cheater. It was to make the probability of undetected
cheating exponentially small that the full BB84 protocol
required the transmission and measurement of a large
number of qubits [4].
A much more remarkable kind of cheating is possible
for Alice, as explained in the same paper that introduced
the BB84 protocol itself [4], which allows her to break the
protocol completely (i.e. enjoy a 0.5-bias) with no fear of
ever being caught. Let us say she wishes the outcome of
the coin flip to be bit c. Instead of sending a legitimate
BB84 state or any other pure state at step 1, Alice sends
half an EPR pair |Ψ−〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)/√2 to Bob and
keeps the other half for herself. She waits until step 3,
when she learns Bob’s choice of b, to measure in basis
a = c⊕ b the half she had kept; let x be her measurement
outcome. This tells her that Bob has obtained (or will
obtain, if he has not yet measured) xˆ = 1 ⊕ x in case
he has measured (or will measure) in basis a. (Alice
does not care about the value of xˆ if Bob chooses to
measure in the other basis.) Hence, she can always obtain
her desired outcome by sending those a and xˆ to Bob in
step 4.
As subsequently discovered independently by Mayers
[24] and by Lo and Chau [22] in the context of quantum
bit commitment, this kind of cheating is always possi-
ble for Alice in any quantum coin-flipping protocol that
has the structure of the BB84 protocol, regardless of the
actual set of quantum states, whenever the density ma-
trices used to signal a = 0 or a = 1 at step 1 are identi-
cal (ρ0 = ρ1). This is due to the striking quantum pro-
cess known as “remote steering”, discovered by Erwin
Schro¨dinger [29] as early as 1936 and better known as
the HJW Theorem [16]. (See Ref. [20] for an entertaining
history of this theorem.) Note that the remote steering
attack works just as well if Bob postpones his measure-
ment until after Alice reveals a and x, and almost just as
well if ρ0 and ρ1, although different, are exponentially in-
distinguishable [14]. This last remark caused the demise
of the bit commitment scheme proposed in Ref. [7] and
we shall henceforth not differentiate between density ma-
trices that are equal and those that are merely exponen-
tially indistinguishable.
4III. AMBAINIS’ PROTOCOL
In order to escape the remote steering attack, Ahar-
onov, Ta-Shma, Vazirani and Yao [1] introduced a coin-
flipping protocol in which ρ0 6= ρ1. To reduce even fur-
ther Alice’s possible bias, they shuffled the order of
steps 2, 3 and 4 so that Bob delays his measurement
of Alice’s supplied state until after she tells him what
she claims to have sent. In this way, he can measure
systematically in the declared basis rather than having
to measure in a randomly chosen basis aˆ whose out-
come had probability 50% of being useless. This allowed
ATVY to design a quantum coin-flipping protocol with
bias
√
2/4 < 0.36, as subsequently proven by Spekkens
and Rudolph [31].
To achieve his smaller bias of 0.25, Ambainis used the
following states on qutrits (rather than on qubits):
|φ0,0〉 = 1√2 |0〉+ 1√2 |1〉
|φ0,1〉 = 1√2 |0〉 − 1√2 |1〉
}
a = 0
|φ1,0〉 = 1√2 |0〉+ 1√2 |2〉
|φ1,1〉 = 1√2 |0〉 − 1√2 |2〉
}
a = 1 .
Again we say of |φa,x〉 that a is the basis and x is the bit.
This time, we define measurement bases
B′a = {|φa,0〉, |φa,1〉, |2− a〉}
for a ∈ {0, 1}. Here is Ambainis’ protocol.
1. Alice prepares one of the four Ambainis states
|φa,x〉 with basis a and bit x chosen independently
at random; she transmits that qutrit to Bob, who
stores it in his quantum memory.
2. Bob sends a randomly chosen bit b to Alice.
3. Alice reveals her original a and x to Bob.
4. Bob takes Alice’s qutrit out of quantum memory
and measures it in basis B′a; let Bob’s result be xˆ.
5. If x 6= xˆ, Bob aborts the protocol, calling Alice a
cheater.
6. If Bob did not abort the protocol, the outcome of
the coin flip is a⊕ b.
Alice cannot use remote steering to gain complete con-
trol over the outcome of the coin flip because the density
matrices that could be received by Bob at step 1, corre-
sponding to her choice a of basis,
ρ0 = 12 |φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|+ 12 |φ0,1〉〈φ0,1| =
 1/2 0 00 1/2 0
0 0 0

and
ρ1 = 12 |φ1,0〉〈φ1,0|+ 12 |φ1,1〉〈φ1,1| =
 1/2 0 00 0 0
0 0 1/2
 ,
(2)
are distinct. It is easy to see that Alice can enjoy a
0.25-bias if she sends state (2|0〉 ± |1〉 ± |2〉)/√6 at step 1
and declares a and x appropriately at step 3. The proof
that this is Alice’s optimal cheating strategy is nontriv-
ial but has been worked out in detail by Ambainis [2].
On the other hand, the fact that ρ0 6= ρ1 makes it pos-
sible for Bob to cheat by measuring Alice’s qutrit before
step 2 in order to learn information about a and bias
his choice of b accordingly. The most obvious strategy
for Bob is to measure Alice’s qutrit in the computational
basis {0, 1, 2}, which allows him to enjoy a 0.25-bias as
well. The fact that this is Bob’s optimal cheating strat-
egy follows directly from Carl W. Helstrom’s optimal
measurement theory [15], which we review in Section V.
For completeness, we mention that the independently-
discovered 0.25-bias quantum coin-flipping protocol of
Spekkens and Rudolph [31] requires Alice to choose a
random bit a, prepare a one-qubit-and-two-qutrit entan-
gled state
|Γa〉 = |a〉 ⊗
(
1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|a+ 1, a+ 1〉
)
and send Bob one of the two qutrits in step 1. Step 2 is
the same as in Ambainis’ protocol. In step 3, Alice sends
the qubit and the other qutrit to Bob, which allows him
to verify her honesty in step 4 by performing a POVM
on the combined Alice-provided state whose outcome is
either |Γ0〉, |Γ1〉 or “Alice cheated”. Again, the result of
the coin flip is a⊕ b provided Bob did not catch Alice
cheating. The essential (but not sufficient) reason why
this protocol gives the same bias as Ambainis’ is that the
density matrix ρa received by Bob at step 1 is exactly
the same in both protocols, as given by Eq. (2).
IV. A PRACTICAL VULNERABILITY
Even though Ambainis’ analysis of his protocol is
mathematically impeccable, there is a practical problem
that cannot be neglected if one is ever to implement such
protocols in real life: there will be unavoidable losses
in the quantum channel between Alice and Bob. This
is true in particular if photons are used to carry quan-
tum information and if the quantum channel is an optical
fibre. Further losses are to be expected in Bob’s quan-
tum memory and detection apparatus. The situation is
even worse for the 0.25-bias protocol of Spekkens and
Rudolph because it requires both Alice and Bob to have
quantum memory since they must store one qutrit each
between steps 1 and 3 (there is no real need for Alice to
store also the qubit since it contains only classical infor-
mation). Please remember that one of the main appeals
of quantum cryptography, from its very beginnings [4],
has been to offer protocols that can be implemented with
current technology, yet remain secure against any poten-
tially future attack so long as quantum mechanics is not
violated.
5It follows that there is a possibility 1, when Bob tries
to measure Alice’s qutrit at step 4 of Ambainis’ proto-
col (or the one-qubit-two-qutrit system in the protocol of
Spekkens and Rudolph), that he does not register any-
thing even though both Alice and Bob have been entirely
honest. How should Bob react in this case? He could
hardly call Alice a cheater if the most likely cause for
loss is in his own detectors! There seem to be only two
reasonable responses from Bob, as pointed out already
by Barrett and Massar [3] concerning a quantum coin-
flipping protocol inspired by the quantum gambling pro-
tocol of Won Young Hwang, Doyeol Ahn and Sung Woo
Hwang [17]: Bob can (1) accept Alice’s declared a and x
on faith or (2) request Alice to restart the coin-flipping
protocol from scratch. But both these “solutions” are
unacceptable.
If Alice knows that Bob will believe her on faith in case
he gets no detection signal, she can totally bias the coin
flip with the most maddeningly simple cheating strat-
egy: she does nothing at all during step 1 and lets Bob
“store” the empty signal. 2 After having received Bob’s
choice of b, she is then free to “reveal” whichever a would
produce her desired outcome a⊕ b. Since Bob’s measure-
ment of the empty signal will yield nothing at step 4, he
has no other choice but to believe Alice on faith.
On the other hand, if Alice and Bob have agreed to
restart the coin-flipping protocol in case Bob does not
detect anything at step 4, it is Bob who can totally bias
the coin flip without any need to manipulate quantum
states. Whenever he receives Alice’s qutrit, he does noth-
ing at all with it and sends his random choice of b. If Alice
reveals a at step 3 so that he is happy with outcome
a⊕ b, with probability 50%, Bob pretends to measure
Alice’s long-lost qutrit and claims to be satisfied with
her honesty. But if he is not happy with the outcome,
Bob simply tells Alice that he has not registered anything
and requests a new instance of the protocol. This con-
tinues until the outcome is to Bob’s liking. This cheat-
ing strategy cannot be detected by Alice whenever the
expected probability p of registering an outcome when
both Alice and Bob are honest is at most 50%, provided
Bob asks to restart the protocol with probability 1− 2p
even when progressing to step 6 would have produced his
desired outcome.
Unless Bob has the technological ability to make sure
he received a quantum state from Alice at step 1 without
disturbing it, and because Alice will not accept to restart
the protocol after she has revealed a and x, he has only
one line of defence against her “send nothing” cheat-
ing strategy: he must measure Alice’s signal immedi-
1 Actually, with current technology, it is more than a mere “pos-
sibility”: this will occur in the overwhelming majority of cases.
2 It would be technologically very challenging for Bob to perform
a so-called “non-demolition measurement”, which would in prin-
ciple allow him to confirm the presence of a qutrit without dis-
turbing its state.
ately upon reception and be allowed to ask her to restart
the protocol from scratch (with an independent random
choice of state) until he actually registers a measurement
outcome. This means that we must revert to the origi-
nal BB84 template in which Bob measures before Alice
reveals a and x.
As explained at the beginning of Section III, this will
make it easier for a cheating Alice to escape detec-
tion since Bob’s measurement can no longer depend on
her claimed state. However, provided Bob chooses his
measurement basis at random, he will carry out with
probability 50% the same measurement he would have
performed in Ambainis’ original protocol. As we prove
in Subsection VI A, it follows that Bob’s probability of
catching Alice’s eventual cheating is reduced, but not by
more than a factor of 2, compared to the original proto-
col. Hence, Alice’s bias is at most 0.375 rather than 0.25.
The important point is that this bias remains below 0.5.
Nevertheless, this modification in Ambainis’ protocol,
which is made necessary by practical considerations (with
current technology), reopens the door for Bob to com-
pletely break the revised protocol! When Alice tells him
she transmitted a qutrit, Bob measures it immediately
in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉, |2〉}. If he obtains
either |1〉 or |2〉, Bob knows Alice’s choice of a. This
allows him to choose b so that a⊕ b suits his desired out-
come. On the other hand, if Bob either obtains |0〉 or if
he does not register anything, then he tells Alice that
the transmission has been unsuccessful and he requests
another qutrit from her. In effect, the protocol will pro-
ceed to the step in which Bob sends his choice of b to Alice
only when he already knows Alice’s earlier choice of a.
This means that Bob enjoys a bias of 0.5 and the pro-
tocol is completely broken. To camouflage his chicanery
(in case Alice might wonder why the measurement does
not succeed more often), Bob can pretend at the outset
that his detectors are half as efficient as they really are.
Alternatively, he could surreptitiously replace the quan-
tum channel that links him to Alice with a sufficiently
better one.
This fatal flaw in any practical implementation of
Ambainis’ protocol comes from one simple consideration.
Even though the mixed states ρ0 and ρ1 (see Eq. 2) used
at step 1 by Alice to partially commit to either a = 0 or
a = 1, respectively, are non-orthogonal, hence they can-
not be distinguished with certainty by Bob all the time,
they can be distinguished conclusively with positive prob-
ability. After reviewing below the notion of conclusive
measurements, we introduce our new protocol in Sec-
tion VI and prove that its bias is exactly 0.4 even when
arbitrarily severe losses are taken into account.
V. DIFFERENT TYPES OF MEASUREMENTS
Consider two non-orthogonal density matrices ρ0 and
ρ1 (they could be pure states). There are several figures
of merit in measurements that attempt to distinguish
6them [14]. Helstrom has studied the optimal measure-
ment to output a guess that minimizes the error proba-
bility [15]. Assuming both ρ0 and ρ1 were equally likely
a priori, Helstrom’s measurement outputs the correct
guess with probability
1
2 +
1
2 D(ρ0, ρ1) , (3)
where
D(ρ0, ρ1) = 12 Tr|ρ0 − ρ1| (4)
is the trace distance between ρ0 and ρ1, “ Tr ” denotes the
trace and |A| =
√
A†A. In particular, if A is a diagonal
real matrix, then |A|ij = |Aij |.
When the spans of ρ0 and ρ1 are distinct, there
exists another type of measurement, known as conclu-
sive measurement or Unambiguous State Discrimination
(USD) [12, 18, 28]. These measurements have three pos-
sible outcomes, “0”, “1” and “?”, the latter of which
being called the inconclusive outcome. Whenever out-
come a ∈ {0, 1} is obtained, it is guaranteed that the
measured state was indeed ρa (assuming of course that is
was either ρ0 or ρ1 and that there were no experimental
errors). Furthermore, the probability of obtaining a con-
clusive outcome (not “?”) must be strictly positive for
either input state.
A well-known example of conclusive measurement can
distinguish between |0〉 and |+〉 with conclusive outcome
probability 1− 1/√2 > 29%. More to the point of our
paper, the obvious measurement in computational basis
{|0〉, |1〉, |2〉} distinguishes between Ambainis’ ρ0 and ρ1
(Eq. 2) with conclusive probability 50%. In general, any
coin-flipping protocol that follows the template of BB84
is vulnerable to the attack described in Section IV when
a conclusive measurement exists between the correspond-
ing ρ0 and ρ1.
It is tempting to think that this line of attack will not
apply when conclusive measurements do not exist. How-
ever, this is not necessarily the case. Erika Andersson,
Stephen M. Barnett, Anthony Chefles, Sarah Croke,
Claire R. Gilson and John Jeffers have studied “Max-
imum confidence quantum measurements” (MCQM),
which somehow interpolate between Helstrom and con-
clusive measurements [10, 11]. Like conclusive measure-
ments, MCQMs have some probability p < 1 of yielding
the “?” inconclusive outcome. However, when the out-
come is either “0” or “1”, it is correct with probabil-
ity at least q > 0. Helstrom’s measurement maximizes q
subject to p = 0 whereas conclusive measurements (when
they exist) minimize p subject to q = 1. There can be
a trade-off between those two probabilities in the sense
that it is sometimes possible to achieve an increase in q
(compared to the accuracy of Helstrom’s measurement)
by tolerating a larger p.
The relevance of MCQMs is that Bob could use them
to increase his coin-flip bias at the cost of increasing his
probability of asking Alice to restart the protocol (pre-
tending he has not registered an outcome). If MCQMs
exist for q arbitrarily close to 1, Bob can come as near
as he wants to choosing the coin-flip outcome, provided
Alice has enough patience (na¨ıvety?) to accept restart-
ing the protocol indefinitely until Bob tells her that he is
ready to continue.
To demonstrate that this is a legitimate worry, con-
sider an (admittedly contrived) quantum coin-flipping
protocol based on Ambainis’ states (see the beginning
of Section III), except that we add |φ0,2〉 = |2〉 and
|φ1,2〉 = |1〉. In step 1, Alice chooses basis a ∈ {0, 1} at
random with uniform probability, but x ∈ {0, 1, 2} is cho-
sen so that Prob(x = 0) = Prob(x = 1) = 49% whereas
Prob(x = 2) = 2%. The density matrix received by Bob
would be either
ρ′0 =
 0.49 0 00 0.49 0
0 0 0.02
 or ρ′1 =
 0.49 0 00 0.02 0
0 0 0.49
 .
These two mixed states cannot be distinguished conclu-
sively. Nevertheless, a measurement in the computa-
tional basis yields either |0〉, which is interpreted as the
inconclusive outcome “?”, or it yields either |1〉 or |2〉,
which are interpreted as either ρ′0 or ρ
′
1, respectively.
This MCQC is inconclusive with probability p = 49%.
When it is not inconclusive, however, the verdict is
correct with probability q = 0.49/0.51 > 96%. This is
much better than Helstrom’s measurement, which would
always give an answer but be correct only with probabil-
ity 73.5% since D(ρ′0, ρ
′
1) = 0.47. Therefore, a quantum
coin-flipping protocol that uses these states would allow
Bob to enjoy a maximal theoretical bias of 0.235 if we
did not take losses into account. However, Bob’s bias
becomes larger than 0.46 if Alice agrees to restart the
protocol whenever he claims to have not registered an
outcome, which he would do whenever his measurement
outcome is the inconclusive |0〉.
VI. A LOSS-TOLERANT PROTOCOL
Now, we introduce our novel quantum coin-flipping
protocol and we prove that its bias is exactly 0.4, regard-
less of the extent of losses that are unavoidable with cur-
rent technology. For this, we use the states introduced
by ATVY in their protocol [1] but revert to the original
BB84 template [4]. Consider the states
|ϕ0,0〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉
|ϕ1,0〉 = α|0〉 − β|1〉
}
x = 0
|ϕ0,1〉 = β|0〉 − α|1〉
|ϕ1,1〉 = β|0〉+ α|1〉
}
x = 1
where α and β are real numbers such that 1 > α > β > 0
and α2 + β2 = 1. See Fig. 1. As always, we say of |ϕa,x〉
that a is the basis and x is the bit. We define measure-
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FIG. 1: Quantum states used in loss-tolerant protocol.
States such as |ϕ0,0〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 are represented in the real
Cartesian plane by a line between the origin and point (α, β).
ment bases mutatis mutandis as we had done in Eq. (1)
for the BB84 states:
B′′a = {|ϕa,0〉, |ϕa,1〉} (5)
for a ∈ {0, 1}. We shall soon see why we have regrouped
the states according to the value of x rather than that
of a as we had done previously. Here is our loss-tolerant
quantum coin-flipping protocol.
1. Alice prepares one of the four states |ϕa,x〉 with
basis a and bit x chosen independently at random;
she transmits that qubit to Bob.
2. Bob chooses a random aˆ ∈ {0, 1} and measures the
received qubit in basis B′′aˆ . If his apparatus does not
register an outcome, he requests Alice to start over
at step 1; otherwise, let the measurement result
be xˆ.
3. Bob sends a randomly chosen bit b to Alice.
4. Alice reveals her original a and x to Bob.
5. If a = aˆ and x 6= xˆ, Bob aborts the protocol, calling
Alice a cheater ; if a 6= aˆ, Bob has no way to verify
Alice’s honesty.
6. If Bob did not abort the protocol, the outcome of
the coin flip is x⊕ b.
There are three differences, compared to the original
BB84 protocol described in Section II: (1) in addition
to having been globally rotated to facilitate subsequent
analysis, the states used are more general in the sense
that bases B′′0 and B′′1 need not be mutually unbiased;
(2) step 2 allows Bob to ask Alice to restart the protocol
in case his measurement apparatus fails to register an
outcome; and (3) the final coin-flip result is x⊕ b rather
than a⊕ b.
The first modification will allow us to fine-tune the
protocol in Subsection VI C. The second modification
makes it possible for the protocol to be loss tolerant
as we have explained in Section IV. The effect of the
third modification, which corresponds to the main orig-
inal contribution of the ATVY protocol, is that two dis-
tinct density matrices %0 and %1 (see below) are now used
by Alice to partially commit to either x = 0 or x = 1
by the transmission of |ϕa,x〉 at step 1 with a randomly
chosen a.
%0 = 12 |ϕ0,0〉〈ϕ0,0|+ 12 |ϕ1,0〉〈ϕ1,0| =
(
α2 0
0 β2
)
and
%1 = 12 |ϕ0,1〉〈ϕ0,1|+ 12 |ϕ1,1〉〈ϕ1,1| =
(
β2 0
0 α2
) (6)
In sharp contrast, the intuition behind the original
BB84 protocol was for Alice to “commit” to either a = 0
or a = 1 with a randomly chosen x, but that was doomed
by Schro¨dinger’s remote steering process because the cor-
responding density matrices were equal.
Furthermore, we shall see in Subsection VI B that, con-
trary to the mixed states ρ0 and ρ1 used in Ambainis’
protocol (see Eq. 2), this time %0 and %1 cannot be distin-
guished conclusively, nor even by a maximum confidence
quantum measurement better than Helstrom’s measure-
ment, which is the key to loss tolerance.
Although we have presented our protocol as a mod-
ification of the original BB84 protocol, it is useful for
analysis purposes to contrast it also with the ATVY pro-
tocol. The key difference between the ATVY protocol
and ours is that they chose to introduce a new template
(used in most subsequent protocols such as Ambainis’)
in which Bob stores the quantum state sent by Alice
at step 1 in order to delay measurement until Alice
has given him its classical description. The intention
was to make it harder for Alice to cheat because Bob
would know to measure the state in basis B′′a rather than
having to choose a random basis B′′aˆ . Unfortunately, as
we have explained, it was this feature that made their
protocol incapable of tolerating channel loss unless Bob
has the technological ability to detect if a signal has
been received by Alice without otherwise disturbing its
state.
Next, we prove that the maximum biases that Alice
and Bob can enjoy are
εA = (1 + 2αβ)/4 and εB = α2 − 1/2 ,
respectively, and we give explicit cheating strategies to
achieve those biases. We conclude that the choice of α
and β that makes those two biases equal corresponds to
a fair protocol whose bias is 0.4.
8A. Alice’s optimal cheating strategy
It would be relatively easy to determine Alice’s opti-
mal cheating strategy were she restricted to sending some
pure state to Bob in the first step of the protocol. How-
ever, we have learned from the demise of the original
BB84 protocol [4] that it might be to her dishonest
advantage to prepare an entangled state, send one qubit
from it to Bob at step 1, and wait until Bob’s announce-
ment of b at step 3 to measure in the most informative
way what she had kept. This could increase her chances
of deciding on her best choice of a and x to “reveal” at
step 4 in order to maximize her probability of success-
fully biasing the coin flip. It is significantly more com-
plicated to take all possible such strategies into account.
Fortunately, most of the work has already been done by
Spekkens and Rudolph in their thorough analysis of the
ATVY protocol [32].
Let us begin our analysis by briefly pretending that
Bob does not measure the state Alice has sent him until
after she reveals her choice of basis and bit, and that he
measures it in that basis. As we have already pointed
out, this becomes the ATVY protocol. It follows directly
from the analysis of Spekkens and Rudolph [choosing
what they call θ in their Eq. (20) so that cos θ = α and
sin θ = β] that any cheating strategy Alice may deploy
gives her bias
ε′A ≤
sin 2θ
2
= sin θ cos θ = αβ . (7)
Now, to analyse our protocol, we must take into
account the fact that we require Bob to measure Alice’s
state before she tells him what she claims to have sent.
(This is how we make our protocol loss tolerant.) This
difference makes it easier for Alice to cheat because Bob’s
measurement cannot be chosen to maximize his probabil-
ity of discriminating between her claimed state and any
other state that she might have sent instead. However, as
we show below, this modification does not reduce Bob’s
probability of catching Alice cheating by more than a
factor of 2.
Recall that Bob is required by step 3 of the protocol
to send a random choice of b, which must be uncorre-
lated with his former choice aˆ of measurement and its
outcome xˆ. The crucial observation is that the random-
ness of b deprives Alice from any information she might
otherwise have obtained from Bob concerning aˆ and xˆ.
(The importance of this observation is illustrated in Sec-
tion VI D.) It follows that her choice of which a and x to
declare at step 4 cannot depend on what has happened at
Bob’s after she transmitted her quantum state at step 1.
In particular, aˆ = a with probability 50% since aˆ is cho-
sen at random by an honest Bob, in which case he has
chosen by chance at step 2 precisely the measurement
he would have performed in the ATVY protocol, had he
been allowed to wait until Alice’s announcement of a and
x before deciding on his measurement.
The above implies that any cheating strategy that
Alice might deploy against our protocol translates into
an identical cheating strategy against the ATVY proto-
col, possibly with a different success probability, since
it makes no measurable difference to Alice whether Bob
measures before (as in our protocol) or after (as in the
ATVY protocol) she has to declare a and x. Now, con-
sider an arbitrary cheating strategy on the part of Alice
and let εA (resp. ε′A) be the bias that she enjoys with this
strategy against our protocol (resp. the ATVY protocol).
Consider an arbitrary run of our protocol, when Alice
uses this cheating strategy. With probability 50%, inde-
pendently from anything else, Bob randomly chooses
the same measurement he would have performed in the
ATVY protocol, in which case Alice succeeds with prob-
ability 12 + ε
′
A. In the other 50% of the cases, Bob cannot
verify the state Alice claims to have sent and the proba-
bility that Alice succeeds is at most 1. All counted, the
success probability of Alice in our protocol is
1
2 + εA ≤ 12
(
1
2 + ε
′
A
)
+ 12 × 1 = 34 + 12ε′A .
It follows that
εA ≤ 1 + 2ε
′
A
4
≤ 1 + 2αβ
4
, (8)
where the last inequality follows from Eq. (7).
We now proceed to show that this bound can be
saturated. Surprisingly (when we recall the demise of
the BB84 quantum coin-flipping protocol), the optimal
cheating strategy for Alice does not require her to pre-
pare an entangled state from which she would send one
qubit at step 1. Instead, it suffices for her to send either
|+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 or |−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2 to Bob. Let
us say she sent |+〉 (the other case is similar) and received
bit b from Bob at step 3. If her desired outcome is c, she
sets x = c⊕ b and claims at step 4 to have sent |ϕx,x〉
at step 1. With probability 50%, Bob had already cho-
sen aˆ 6= x, in which case he cannot catch Alice cheat-
ing. With complementary probability 50%, he had cho-
sen aˆ = x, in which case Alice escapes detection with
probability
|〈+|ϕx,x〉|2 =
(
1√
2
α+ 1√
2
β
)2
=
(α+ β)2
2
= 12 + αβ
(the last equality is because α2 + β2 = 1). Putting it all
together, Alice obtains her desired outcome with proba-
bility
1
2
+
1
2
(
1
2
+ αβ
)
=
3 + 2αβ
4
and her bias is therefore
εA =
3 + 2αβ
4
− 1
2
=
1 + 2αβ
4
,
which saturates the bound given in Eq. (8).
9B. Bob’s optimal cheating strategy
In the analysis of Bob’s bias in quantum coin-flipping
protocols, it is usual to apply Eqs. (3) and (4) to com-
pute the trace distance D(%0, %1) = α2 − β2 = 2α2 − 1 in
order to determine that the optimal Helstrom measure-
ment that Bob could perform to best guess Alice’s com-
mitted bit (here, x) gives him the correct answer with
probability α2. From this, we would “normally” conclude
that Bob’s maximal bias is α2 − 1/2.
As we have seen, however, this approach is not appro-
priate in our context because it does not take into account
the eventual possibility for Bob to increase his bias
by making conclusive or maximum confidence quantum
measurements on the state sent by Alice at step 1, so
that he could ask her to restart the protocol whenever he
is not sufficiently satisfied with the probability that his
guess of x be correct.
Fortunately, the analysis of Bob’s optimal cheating
strategy is straightforward in this case. For either value
of x ∈ {0, 1} that Alice may have chosen in step 1, Eq. (6)
shows the mixed state %x that Bob would receive from
her. The key observation is that, algebraically speak-
ing, %0 = α2|0〉〈0|+ β2|1〉〈1| and %1 = β2|0〉〈0|+ α2|1〉〈1|.
It follows that, from a cheating Bob’s perspective, whose
only concern is in guessing x as best as possible (includ-
ing the possibility of asking Alice to restart the proto-
col if he is not satisfied with his own confidence in his
guess), this is strictly identical to an alternative scenario
in which Alice would have sent |0〉 with probability α2
or |1〉 with probability β2 in case x = 0, and vice versa
in case x = 1. In other words, this is exactly as if Alice
had communicated her choice of x to Bob as the purely
classical signal |x〉 through a binary symmetric channel
with error probability β2.
Seen this way, there is nothing quantum about the
situation. Hence, a complete measurement in the com-
putational basis of the state received by Alice provides
Bob with an optimal cheating strategy since it yields
all the information classically available in the “quan-
tum” signal! Not surprisingly, this is indeed precisely
Helstrom’s measurement. In particular, the outcome
of this measurement does not give Bob any indication
on whether or not it would be to his advantage to ask
Alice to restart the protocol. (Note that it is not sim-
ply because Alice’s signal can be thought of as classi-
cal that there cannot be a conclusive or a maximum
confidence measurement; in particular, erasure chan-
nels provide the classical equivalent to quantum con-
clusive measurements—but binary symmetric channels
don’t.)
To summarize, Bob’s optimal cheating strategy is to
measure Alice’s qubit in the computational basis in
order to learn the value of x with error probability β2.
This allows him to choose b appropriately and obtain
his desired outcome x⊕ b with complementary probabil-
ity α2, thus enjoying his optimal bias εB = α2 − 1/2.
C. A fair protocol
In this subsection, we find the value of α so that the
bias either player can achieve by cheating is the same.
We simply need to fulfil the condition
εA = εB ,
which for our protocol amounts to
1 + 2αβ
4
= α2 − 1
2
,
subject to α2 + β2 = 1. Solving this system yields
α =
√
0.9 and β =
√
0.1 ,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. These values correspond to
εA = εB = 0.4 ,
which defines a fair loss-tolerant quantum coin-flipping
protocol whose bias is 0.4. In other words, either player
can obtain a desired outcome with probability 90% by
using an optimal cheating strategy, provided of course
the other player is honest. But what if they both try to
cheat?
D. The cunning game
An interesting phenomenon is illustrated if we take the
unusual step of considering the case when both Alice and
Bob cheat. The most obvious example of double-cheating
occurs when Alice is convinced that Bob is so greedy
that he will try his best to control the coin flip. In this
case, Alice can send an honest quantum state in step 1.
To maximize his chances of guessing Alice’s choice of x,
Bob measures the state in the computational basis, as
we have seen. This allows him to send Alice a value
of b that produces his desired outcome with probability
90% (assuming they use the fair version of the protocol).
But at the same time, he has lost his ability to verify
the honesty of Alice since he did not measure her qubit
in a legitimate basis. Suspecting this, Alice is free to
claim whatever suits her best at step 4, probably lying
about x, and Bob cannot look her in the face and call
her a cheater!
For an amusing variation on this theme, consider what
happens if both parties attempt to perform their optimal
cheating strategies simultaneously. In this case, Alice
sends either |+〉 or |−〉, which Bob measures in basis
{|0〉, |1〉}. When Bob attempts influencing the coin flip
by choosing b as a function of his measurement outcome,
little does he suspect that his choice is in fact totally ran-
dom: ironically, Bob follows the honest protocol at step 3!
For a more subtle example, consider a scenario accord-
ing to which Bob is Alice’s young son. They agree to
flip a quantum coin to determine who will decide on the
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film to be seen tonight: Alice will have the choice if the
outcome is 1 and Bob if it is 0. Alice knows that her
little rascal will do his best to cheat and win, but also
that he will follow step 2 properly (rather than measur-
ing in the computational basis) because he will not want
to relinquish his possibility to catch his mother cheat-
ing at verification step 5—or so he thinks. Hence, Bob’s
cheating will consist in sending b = xˆ at step 3 instead of
choosing b at random. After a calculation, we find that
this gives him probability 82% that b = x, thus producing
his winning outcome x⊕ b = 0.
Unbeknownst to Bob, however, his mother wants him
to win, but she does not wish him to know this for fear of
undermining her authority! Assuming she knows her son
as well as she thinks, she proceeds as follows. At step 1,
she honestly sends some random state |ϕa,x〉. When she
receives Bob’s choice of b at step 3, there are two pos-
sibilities. If b = x, she can relax and continue honestly
since Bob wins, according to her wish. On the other
hand, if b 6= x, then Alice can deduce that Bob used the
wrong basis in his measurement: aˆ 6= a. This allows her
to “reveal” a together with any x˜ of her choice at step 4
since she knows (or suspects) that Bob will be unable to
call her a cheater. According to our story, she chooses
x˜ = b to make Bob happy.
Admittedly, the above tale is unlikely at best. Never-
theless, it serves the purpose of demonstrating the im-
portance in our proof of security against Alice (Subsec-
tion VI A) that Bob’s bit b be chosen randomly despite
the fact that he has significant information about Alice’s
x after an honest measurement at step 2. Indeed, our
proof relied in a crucial way on the fact that Alice would
have no information on the measurement basis used by
Bob. Our tale shows how wrong and damaging it would
have been had the protocol asked an honest Bob to send
a b correlated to his measurement outcome.
E. Side channels
We have seen that Bob could exploit the loss of quan-
tum information to cheat in previous protocols, whereas
our protocol is loss tolerant. Nevertheless, our proto-
col could become susceptible to loss if it were imple-
mented with insufficient care. A side channel is any
source of information that Bob could exploit about the
quantum state sent by Alice above and beyond its theo-
retical definition as a pure qubit. For example, the proto-
col would be obviously insecure if the apparatus used by
Alice to generate her quantum states produced each of
the four legitimate states as photons of significantly dif-
ferent wavelengths or spatial position. These issues have
been studied extensively in the context of quantum key
distribution. See Ref. [33] for a compelling example of
successful hacking of a commercially available apparatus.
An interesting example of side channel would occur in
a careless implementation of our quantum coin-flipping
protocol if Alice used an attenuated laser pulse to gener-
ate her states, as is done in most current implementations
of quantum key distribution. The problem stems from
the fact that one can distinguish conclusively between %0
and %1 (Eq. 6) when a pulse consists of two (or more)
identical ATVY states. For this, it suffices for Bob to
measure one photon in basis B′′0 and the other in basis B′′1
(Eq. 5). If the two measurements produce the same
outcome, this is necessarily the correct bit x encoded
by Alice since one of the measurement has been per-
formed in the correct basis. This occurs with probability
(α2 − β2)2. With the fair states, Bob’s probability of
conclusive outcome is therefore a substantial 64% each
time a pulse contains two photons, which means that
this implementation of the protocol is completely inse-
cure because Bob can request another state from Alice
until this event occurs.
To make the case of attenuated laser pulses even
worse, a perfectly natural measurement apparatus that
an honest Bob could use in the implementation of our
protocol [5] would produce such conclusive outcome with
half the probability derived above, namely 32% of the
double-photon pulses. It follows that Bob, who started
the protocol with pure intentions, might find it difficult to
resist sliding to the dark side when his (honest!) measure-
ment apparatus reveals with certainty the value of x cho-
sen by Alice. A practical solution to this problem is for
Alice to use a source of entangled photons, as discussed
in Ref. [5].
VII. CONCLUSION
Quantum coin flipping is a cryptographic primitive
that has been studied extensively. Several approaches
have been considered since the very beginnings of quan-
tum cryptography. However, previous protocols are
either totally insecure [4], or they are highly sensitive to
(if not completely broken by) technologically unavoidably
losses of quantum information on the channel between
the players or in their storage and detection appara-
tus [1, 2, 9, 27, 31, 32]. In this paper, we introduced the
first loss-tolerant quantum coin-flipping protocol, which
means that it is completely impervious to such losses.
We proved that our protocol is fair in the sense that both
Alice and Bob have an optimal cheating strategy capable
of producing their desired outcome with 90% probability
of success (assuming the other player is honest) and we
provided those strategies explicitly.
Even though our protocol can tolerate arbitrary loss
of quantum information, it would fail in case of noise
because it would be impossible for Bob to know, in case
of a mismatch between his measurement outcome and
Alice’s claimed state, if that is due to a genuine error
(on his part or Alice’s) or to Alice’s dishonesty. Recall
that this may be unavoidable; indeed Barrett and Massar
have argued that single-shot quantum coin-flipping pro-
tocols are problematic when both noise and loss can
occur [3].
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If secure single-shot quantum coin-flipping protocols
are indeed impossible in the presence of noise, is there
something useful that quantum coin flipping can do above
and beyond anything classically possible? We already
know that random bit-string generation [3] is not the
answer given that it can be done classically [8]. We are
currently investigating this issue [5] along a different line
from that proposed in Ref. [27].
Another open question concerns the optimality of our
protocol. Could there be a loss-tolerant quantum coin-
flipping protocol whose bias is smaller than 0.4? Alter-
natively, can we prove that 0.4 is the smallest bias pos-
sible among all loss-tolerant quantum coin-flipping pro-
tocols? Finally, we mention that this paper was entirely
concerned with the task known as strong coin flipping.
There exists a similar task, weak coin flipping, in which
only one outcome is favourable for Alice, the other out-
come being the only one favourable for Bob. Protocols
with arbitrarily small bias are known to exist for weak
coin flipping [26], in stark contrast with Kitaev’s lower
bound for the strong case [21]. Can loss-tolerant quan-
tum weak coin-flipping protocols exist with arbitrarily
small bias? This question will be addressed in a subse-
quent paper.
We have recently implemented our own loss-tolerant
protocol and we have successfully tested it against Alice’s
and Bob’s optimal cheating strategies. We report on
those experiments elsewhere [5]. This was in a sense
going full circle because it was our wish to implement
Ambainis’ quantum coin-flipping protocol that lead to
the realization that we could never succeed and thus to
the development of our new protocol.
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